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Abstract
In vie len  der neu en EU-Mit glieds staa ten
tra ten  in jüngs ter  Zeit Span nun gen  auf,  die
Fra gen  nach  der Ver an ke rung ih rer De mo -
kra ti en auf wer fen.  Der Bei trag be leuch tet
die Ur sa chen die ser Span nun gen  und kon -
zent riert  sich da bei  auf  drei Fak to ren:  die
Lo gik  der Trans for ma ti on,  die Schwä che
der po li ti schen In sti tu tio nen  und  die  Art
der so zia len Prä fe ren zen  und Wert hal tun -
gen.  Der Bei tritt  zur  EU  hat  zwei Wir kun -
gen:  Er ver bes sert  die de mo kra ti schen
Bedin gun gen  durch  die Kräf ti gung  der In sti -
tu tio nen,  der Selbst re gie rung  und  des
Rechts.  Aber  er  stärkt  auch  den –  für  die Pe -
ri o de  der Trans for ma ti on cha rak te ris ti schen
– Vor rang öko no mi schen Wan dels ge gen -
über  dem po li ti schen En ga ge ment  der
Gesell schaft. Da rü ber hi naus sti mu lie ren EU-
Ent wick lungs fonds wirt schaft li ches Wachs -
tum, dämp fen  aber zu gleich  das po li ti sche
In te res se –  mit  der Kon se quenz,  dass po pu -
lis ti sche  und eu ro skep ti sche Eli ten  in Po len
ei ne über wie gend pro-eu ro pä i sche Ge sell -
schaft re gie ren. Da her soll te  von ei ner „Eli -
ten-“,  nicht  von ei ner „Mas sen re vol te“ ge -
spro chen wer den.  Auf lan ge  Sicht dürf ten
die for ma len de mo kra ti schen Me cha nis men
zu ei ner Ver rin ge rung  der ge gen wär ti gen
Dis kre panz zwi schen Eli ten  und Ge sell -
schaft füh ren.
The political situation and the condition of democracy in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe raise astonishment and concern among observers. Many of
them ask why, several years after regaining independence, Hungary is torn by
conflict and street demonstrations, the Czechs have problems forming a govern-
ment, and in Poland and Slovakia the ruling coalitions are made up, among oth-
ers, of populist and nationalist parties. Until recently, only Poland has been men-
tioned as a country with an unstable and unconsolidated political system. Now,
many more new EU member states have problems. Integration does not have di-
rect influence on the political system of a country, and certainly its effects are not
visible in the short term. Therefore, a question arises about the factors that may
cause the increase of political tension in the new member states. 
I. Integration Has Strengthened the Logic of Transformation
In some Central and Eastern European countries the transformation took place
due to the priority of economic over politics. Those who implemented the re-
forms in Poland, Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz and the economists
close to him, acknowledged that introduction of market mechanisms and build-
ing of economic institutions would, in a natural way, result in a strengthening of
democracy in the future. Development of civil society was not treated as impor-
tant, and the constitution was adopted in Poland only five years after the trans-
formation started. One could even say that politicians had an interest in the pub-
lic’s civic activity level remaining low while introducing the new economic
system; they were afraid of the public reaction to the initial fall of many social
groups’ living standards and the increase in social inequality and unemployment.
They believed that a high level of civic activity and a high turnout at the polls
might block the market reforms as post - communist and populist parties would
win. The politicians and economists introducing reforms believed that the low
level of civic and political activity will facilitate the implementation of a market
economy. 
According to Edmund Mokrzycki,1 in the first phase of transformation mar-
ket reforms could be implemented thanks to the fact that the main groups whose
interests were threatened did not use the democratic mechanisms that could
block the introduction of those reforms. The lack of political participation of the
main groups and actors was favourable to the implementation of market reforms
and, consequently, to the economic participation of a number of people.
Undoubtedly, that logic of the first stage of transformation affected the con-
solidation of changes in Poland and, in particular, the way in which democratic
and market institutions operate. While creating favourable conditions for market
reforms, it made it difficult for the elite groups and for society to learn democracy.
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1 Cf. Andrzej Rychard, Threats to democracy: on some Polish paradoxes. Paper deliv-
ered on a seminar commemorating Prof. Edmund Mokrzycki, organised by the
Institute of Social Studies of the Polish Academy of Science, September 2002.
As a result, in Poland in 2005 the level of legitimisation of the market econo-
my was much higher than the legitimisation of democracy.2 This applies to the
four levels of analysis on which the attitude to democracy is examined : 1) legit-
imisation of the system, 2) functioning of the principles and the political system,
3) assessment of institutions, and 4) assessment of actors. 
First of all, in Poland, while the legitimisation of the democratic system is rel-
atively low, that of the market economy is much higher. In international compar-
ative studies carried out in 2001, only 52 % of Polish respondents were of the
opinion that democracy is the best form of government, whereas the average for
other countries in the region was 65 %.3
Centre for Public Opinion Research ( Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej
–CBOS ) polls indicate that the general level of legitimisation has not increased
after Polish accession to the European Union, as indicated in Table 1. 
Table 1 : Political system preferences (Do you agree or do you not agree with the
view that democracy is better than any other form of government?) 
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2 Cf. Lena Kolarska - Bobińska/Olga Pucek, Polski kapitalizm po piętnastu latach –
społeczna ocena funkcjonowania systemu gospodarczego. In: Institute of Public
Affairs (ed.), Świadomość ekonomiczna społeczeństwa i wizerunek biznesu, ed. Lena
Kolarska - Bobińska, Warsaw 2004, p. 132–154.
3 Cf. Dieter Fuchs/Edeltraud Roller, Learned Democracy? Support of Democracy in
Central and Eastern Europe. In: International Journal of Sociology, 3 (2006), p. 70–96.
Replies of respondents according to the time of interview ( Percentage )
Oct
92
Jun
93
May
95
Oct
97
Mar
99
Apr
00
Oct
00
Nov
01
Mar
02
May
04
Nov
06
I agree 52 62 67 63 64 71 70 63 66 60 62
I don’t
agree 15 11 17 16 19 12 12 17 14 18 18
It is diffi-
cult to say 33 27 16 21 17 17 18 20 20 22 20
Data : http://www.cbos.pl. 
I will devote a separate part of this paper to institutions; here it is only worth
emphasising that the institutions of democratic order do not enjoy a high level of
confidence either. The most important market economy institutions, on the oth-
er hand, such as private companies, banks and the stock exchange, receive posi-
tive assessment. According to 76 % of Poles, the activities of private companies
are beneficial to the society, while the activities of the Parliament are beneficial
in the opinion of 20 % of respondents. The respondents believed that private
companies contribute to the economic development of the country (81 %), cre-
ate new jobs (79 %), and also work for charity (64 %).4
In addition, in the opinion of Andrzej Rychard, inclusion in market economy
is much stronger, compared to rather limited political participation in Polish so-
ciety.5 That also applies to participation in the role of producers, which is indi-
cated by an increase in the number of small enterprises, as well as in the role of
consumers. The author concludes that “the post - communist transformation is,
to a greater extent, based on consumers rather than on citizens”.6
As I have already mentioned, EU accession has not had any significant effect
on social support for democracy or confidence in democratic institutions. Nor
has it removed the inequality between the level of approval for the market econ-
omy ( as opposed to politics ), and between economic, political and civic partici-
pation. Furthermore, European integration seems to strengthen the current log-
ic of transformation. Right now, the most strongly perceived effect of European
integration is the influx of EU funds and economic growth; these factors stimu-
late citizens’ economic activity, but not political participation. Poles focus on
starting new companies, they go to work abroad, and implement EU projects;
they perceive politics as irrelevant to their lives. 
Furthermore, the well - developing economy strengthens the citizens’ convic-
tion that politics is a remote, unimportant area, which performs badly while the
economy performs ever better. Many people seem to think that “It does not mat-
ter who is in power, what matters is that they should not hinder the economic de-
velopment and should not prevent us from improving the situation of our fami-
lies”. As a consequence, their identification with democracy is low, as indicated
in Table 2.
Table 2 : Identification with the democratic system ( For people such as me it
does not really matter whether the government is democratic or undemocratic.)
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4 Cf. Bolesław Rok, Biznes w społeczeństwie – oczekiwania i ich realizacja. In: Institute
of Public Affairs (ed.), Świadomość ekonomiczna społeczeństwa i wizerunek biznesu,
ed. Lena Kolarska - Bobińska, Warsaw 2004, p. 76–98.
5 Cf. Rychard, Threats to democracy.
6 Ibid.
( Percentage )
Oct 92 Jun 93 May 95 Mar 99 Oct 00 Mar 02 May 04 Nov 06
I agree 44 44 45 41 38 49 42 42
I do not agree 36 40 45 45 47 40 43 44
It is difficult to say 20 15 10 14 15 11 15 14
Data : http://www.cbos.pl.
Therefore, economic prosperity does not necessarily lead to development of
civic attitudes, as some democracy researchers would expect; just the opposite, it
may reinforce the attitudes of civic passivity and political alienation. Thus, the
key question is : What conditions must be fulfilled for economic growth to im-
prove the functioning of democracy, to stimulate civic participation ? 
Perhaps the key factor explaining people’s attitudes towards democracy is the
type of political culture. Thus its evolution, not related directly to the European
integration, may lead to an improvement in the quality of democracy. Another
hypothesis may also be proposed : even though integration does not have any di-
rect influence on the general acceptance of democracy, it may, however, stimu-
late growth of criticism against the way in which democracy functions in certain
countries.
Another hypothesis may also be formulated concerning the influence of inte-
gration over the institutional order and not on attitudes towards democracy. It
seems that while EU accession does not have any significant influence on the
general legitimisation of democracy, it does significantly affect the institutional
order of a country. 
II. Institutional Consequences of European Integration
In democracy, procedures and institutions play a key role. The most recent sur-
vey published by Eurobarometer shows that in the new member states the level
of trust in political institutions is very low, much lower than in the states where
democracy has been deeply rooted.7
One reason for this discrepancy is that elite groups in Poland, and also in
some other Central and Eastern European countries, do not understand the role
that institutions and mechanisms play in democracy. Politicians who have been
in power since 1989 have been learning the basics of politics in opposition to the
communist system of law and government. The opposition would function
thanks to circumventing the formal mechanisms and avoiding contact with pub-
lic institutions. After independence was regained, that attitude towards institu-
tions has had significant influence on how the Solidarity politicians that came to
power have perceived the role of institutions. Democracy has been more often
understood as freedom and justice, rather than as procedural democracy based
on law, mechanisms and institutions.8
During transformation, Polish elite groups did not attach much importance to
the public institutions because these institutions, to a great extent, served to fur-
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7 Cf. European Social Reality, Special Eurobarometer 273, European Commission,
December 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ index_en.htm,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ index_en.htm. 
8 Cf. Fuchs/Roller, Learned Democracy?
ther party, or even group, interests. They were expected to facilitate the building
and consolidating of the political party that was currently in power. Political
goals took precedence over long - term perception of public benefit, and party in-
terests were more important than public interests. The institutional order, in-
stead of being increasingly consolidated, became the object and the aim of polit-
ical games of subsequent groups that gained power. Now, the role of the formal
mechanisms in regulating and stabilising social behaviour is increasingly less im-
portant, while the institutional order itself increasingly becomes a source of un-
certainty. As a result, the low effectiveness of many institutions representing the
legislative, executive and judicial powers results in a low level of public approval
and trust. 
Jan Kubik, comparing the performance of institutions in different Central and
Eastern European countries, points to the particular weakness of the state and
the state administration in Poland. He writes that in the countries of the region
the state is “runaway and bloated” and that those countries lack a professional
civil service. World Bank reports also mention a “capture of the state” that is
submitting the state to party and group interests, which the reports regard as
one of the most important problems for Central and Eastern European coun-
tries.9
Many people hoped that EU accession would bring about an improvement in
the way democratic institutions and state administration operate. They believed
that since the European institutions were efficient, the institutions in Poland
would become “Europeanised” as well. Studies carried out by the Institute of
Public Affairs before Polish accession to the EU indicated that the respondents
trusted EU institutions much more than Polish ones. They also believed that, un-
like Polish institutions, the EU institutions operated efficiently, in the interest of
the citizens, and that they were not corrupt.10
As we can see in Tables 3 and 4, after the accession the perception of Polish
institutions has not changed, whereas the assessment of EU institutions has be-
come less favourable. In Poland after the EU accession, the trust in democratic
institutions has not grown either. The new rule of the radical parties that came to
power in 2005 – with the promise of increasing public trust and the efficiency of
the state administration –and public trust to them has not contributed to a
growth of confidence in democratic institutions ( see Tables 5 and 6). The confi-
dence level remains one of the lowest in Europe. The rule of populist and nation-
alist parties has however, contributed to a growth of confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice, as this government attaches great importance to the reform of
that sector and fighting the fight with corruption. 
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9 Cf. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, Agency System in Poland after 1989, Institute of Public
Affairs, Warsaw 2004; Jan Kubik, East Central Europe : political trends after the last
round of elections, presentation at the conference “the future of the Political scene in
Central Europe”, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2006.
10 Cf. Krzysztof Pankowski, Parlament Europejski oraz polskie i unijne instytucje w
opinii Polaków, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2003.
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Table 3 : Opinions on the operation of EU institutions
Institutions of the European Union :
Replies of respondents according to the 
time of interview (%)
Mar 2003* Sep 2005
– care first of all for the interests of ordinary
citizens 39 30
– care first of all for the interests of officials 32 44
It is difficult to say 29 26
– operate efficiently 50 45
– do not operate efficiently 15 23
It is difficult to say 35 32
– generally act honestly 51 43
– are rather corrupt 18 28
It is difficult to say 30 29
– usually deal with important matters 66 52
– usually deal with unimportant matters 10 22
It is difficult to say 24 26
The existing state institutions in Poland :
Replies of respondents according to the time
of interview (%)
Mar 2003* Sep 2005
– care first of all for the interests of ordi-
nary citizens 4 7
– care first of all for the interests of those
who are in power and officials 89 83
It is difficult to say 7 10
– operate efficiently 7 8
– do not operate efficiently 80 78
It is difficult to say 13 14
– generally act honestly 8 8
– are rather corrupt 78 78
It is difficult to say 15 14
– usually deal with important matters 17 17
– usually deal with unimportant matters 65 65
It is difficult to say 18 18
* Data : Institute of Public Affairs, http://www.isp.org.pl. Source : http://www.cbos.pl. 
* Data : Institute of Public Affairs, http://www.isp.org.pl. Source : http//www.cbos.pl.
Table 4 : Opinions on the operation of state institutions in Poland
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Currently, the institutional development in Poland is uneven. The consolida-
tion of the party system and strengthening of political parties coincides with the
weakening of other institutions, including the central administration. This weak-
ening has been caused by a change to the law on civil service, introduced by the
ruling Law and Justice party ( Prawo i Sprawiedliwość ); as a result, the civil serv-
ice is slowly disappearing before it has even properly developed. Political nomi-
nations predominate in public institutions and in companies in which the state
has a share. The latter have lost a number of specialists, who have been replaced
with loyal and trusted friends. That process is accompanied with some anti - insti-
tutional rhetoric promoted by the right - wing and populist parties currently in
power in Poland. This rhetoric emphasises personal connections and leaders’
trust as a desired mechanism of personnel selection. Procedures, competitions
and qualifications are unimportant, but personal assessment by the leaders plays
the key role. Statements such as, “I’m losing my patience with them” or “I trust
him” etc., reflect the imperial mentality of Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński.
Such rhetoric weakens not only the already weak public institutions, but also un-
dermines people’s faith in the possibility of having apolitical mechanisms exist-
ing and operating in a state. The weakening of central institutions is accompa-
nied by the strengthening of local self - government and institutions.
One of the reasons for the uneven development of institutions is, apart from
those mentioned above, the method of funds distribution. At the beginning of
the transformation, the public administration was the one who had resources
that parties were willing to use to build their power base. Privatised companies
had contracts to award, and permissions or concessions for business activity
were issued. It seems that after the EU accession, the EU funds will strengthen
regional and local self - government authorities, which manage those funds.
European integration will primarily strengthen the local authorities, local self -
government and some non - governmental organisations.
A few years ago, local self - government in Poland was granted more power
and possibilities to make decisions with respect to different spheres of life of
their citizens. However, proper funding did not follow that empowerment. Local
authorities often complained that they were responsible for roads, schools or
hospitals but had received very little funding for their development. Now, after
several years, significant funding for various projects will be within the reach of
local authorities for the first time. 
Recent local elections were the first such elections in which Polish accession
to the European Union had a significant impact on their course. Even though the
turnout was similar to the elections four years earlier (45 %), it did not fall be-
cause of the negative attitude towards central government policies. In big cities it
was the parties who fought the battle, but in small towns and in rural areas the
winners were those who had been believed to be good administrators.
Distribution of European funds turned out to be an important argument for both
voters and their elected representatives. In that sense, European integration has
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played a positive role in local elections, which has been confirmed by the voters
themselves.
Various EU - funded projects have already started in many cities and towns,
which is how the re - election of some incumbent mayors has sometimes been ex-
plained. Local authorities which have been successful in applying for EU funds
benefited from it. The newly elected authorities also have a great chance to see
their regions developing, and a chance to be re - elected in a few years. 
EU integration, by strengthening local self - government, will be beneficial to
local democracy. There is still a question whether this will eventually translate in-
to better consolidation of democracy on a more general level. 
However, an analysis of the use of structural funds, the most powerful tool to
accelerate the process of equalising the level of economic development, in thir-
teen EU Member States has shown that it is an effective tool only in those coun-
tries which have “high quality” institutions.11 The countries which have put par-
ticular emphasis on strengthening their institutions have managed to make good
use of EU funding. A question arises as whether the hitherto weak development
of institutions responsible for distributing EU funds will not cause improper use
of those funds, and whether those funds will not be wasted before they con-
tribute to the development of a number of local organisations. 
III. Social Consequences of Joining the European Union
Attitudes towards democracy and political preferences depend on the economic
situation of a country and of individuals; they also depend on socio - psychologi-
cal attitudes. Ivan Krastev, a well - know Bulgarian sociologist, explains the politi-
cal instability in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a revolt of the
masses.12 In his view, citizens who have been used to stable living conditions
must, after their countries join the EU, adjust to a situation of uncertainty caused
by globalisation. Joining the European Union has negatively influenced fragile
democracies, in part because governments prefer to agree their policies with
Brussels and not with their voters. As a result, Krastev claims, the division be-
tween the political left and right has been blurred, and the line dividing the cor-
rupt elite from ordinary citizens has become more apparent. 
I think Krastev’s diagnosis is only partly true. Central and Eastern European
governments have never discussed their policies with the public, so it is hard to
claim that after the accession they stopped doing so. Social dialogue hardly exists
in post - communist countries. The market reforms were agreed to by the anti -
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11 Cf. Sjef Ederveen/Henri de Groot/Richard Nahuis, Fertile Soil for Structural Funds?,
Amsterdam 2002.
12 Cf. Ivan Krastev, The Revolt of the Masses. In: The Wall Street Journal from
27.9.2006.
communist elite and by groups ruling during the previous regime, and they were
introduced with the approval of various international institutions. Also, the
Polish public was not consulted with other reforms, including territorial, social
security and educational reforms. The voters simply voted every four years, re-
jecting subsequent governments which had implemented the changes. Neither
Brussels nor European integration can therefore be “blamed” for voter alien-
ation and low civic participation.
Joining the European Union, however, did influence the current political situ-
ation. Integration, like any other significant change, raised a lot of concerns and
doubts, as well as uncertainty. It was, after all, the final stage concluding the sys-
tem transformation that started in 1989. After the EU accession, even though
the public support for integration grew significantly in Poland, the public re-
leased their initial fears. In the first parliamentary elections after the accession,
in 2005, some people voted for populist and nationalist parties, which promised
to introduce law and order as well as seek the country’s independence and stabil-
isation.
It is also important that after the accession the consensus of the elite groups
has been broken. Before, there was general agreement as to the main direction
of changes in Poland, consisting of the introduction of a market economy and
joining NATO and the European Union. Now those goals have been achieved.
What is more, European policy has partly become the internal policy of the mem-
ber states. In such a situation where the main objectives constituting the raison
d’état and providing for consensus disappear, some ideological issues have come
to the front. This has lead to a strong polarisation of debate and to a distinct di-
vision of the elite groups into political camps – populist and liberal – which are
unable to reach agreement even on the issues that are the most basic and vital
for the country. 
Therefore, what is happening now in the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries should be called a revolt of some parts of the elite, rather than a revolt of
the masses. Right now, in Poland we have a society that is pro - European, that
makes use of the opportunities provided by the Union, and politicians who em-
phasise their scepticism towards the European Union. In a democratic system, in
a situation of such divergence of views, politicians promoting unpopular ideas
resign, or lose in the next coming elections. 
In the short term, the influence of EU membership is ambiguous and multi - di-
rectional. In the long term, the strengthening of the mechanisms of law and the
institutions will enhance democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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